This paper investigates how the macroeconomic business cycle impacts the empirical relation between innovation and firm growth. Based on representative panel data of Swiss firms ranging from 1996 to 2014, the paper finds that firms with innovations based on R&D activities show higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms in periods dominated by economic recessions. This finding is in line with the idea that recessions play an important role in the adaptation process of the economy towards the innovative. In contrast, the paper finds that firms with innovations based on other, non-R&D innovation activities show higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms in periods dominated by economic booms. Hence, while firms with innovations based on R&D activities are more resilient to business cycle fluctuations than non-innovative firms, firms with innovations based on other, non-R&D innovations activities are more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations than non-innovative firms.
Introduction
Economic crises are a frequently observed phenomenon in market economies. They are usually accompanied by substantial economic turbulences and tend to challenge the market position of many incumbent firms. This provides growth opportunities for some types of firms, which consequently trigger a re-adjustment of the economy as a whole. From a representative survey in Switzerland, we know that by 2013, 38.8% of all firms emerged stronger out of the recession caused by financial crisis of 2008 . But what characterises these types of firms? This paper argues that innovative firms are especially resilient to the adverse consequences brought about by an economic crisis. Knowledge about the diverging effects of economic crises on firms is important information for policy-makers because measures to increase the innovation potential of firms may not only increase domestic wealth, but may also greatly foster the resilience of the economy in difficult times.
The existing literature puts a considerable emphasis on how the macroeconomic business cycle affects the innovation inputs of firms. It largely agrees that innovation inputs such as R&D expenditures tend to move pro-cyclically (e.g. Geroski and Walters 1995; Rammer, Penzkofer, Grenzmann, and Stephan 2004; Ouyang 2011; Arvanitis and Woerter 2014) ; firms increase their innovation inputs in economic booms and decrease them in recessions, mainly because of fluctuations in cash-flows (Hall 1992; Aghion et al. 2012) .
The empirically observed pro-cyclical variation of innovation inputs may have a considerable impact on the long-run growth development of an economy (Stiglitz 1993) . In the short-run, however, changes in innovation inputs do not affect economic growth. Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen (2010) subsume that there is on average an about 2-3-year lag until innovation inputs such as R&D expenditures translate into visible innovation results. Hence, while firms may substantially adjust their innovation inputs to the ups and downs of the macroeconomic business cycle, the innovation output is not immediately affected. To face the sudden changes brought about by a cyclical shock, the firm must thus rely on the innovation output it has already present at the exact time the cyclical shock strikes. The lead time from a change in innovation input until the commercialisation of the respective innovation output is simply too long. In this paper, we are therefore interested in how business cycle shocks shape the impact of the already existing innovation output on the development of firm growth. To empirically investigate this research question, we examine how the growth rates of innovative firms differ from the growth rates of non-innovative firms over the different stages of the macroeconomic business cycle.
The paper builds on the business cycle theory of Schumpeter (1939) , who regards innovations introduced by firms as growth stimuli that move the economy constantly forward and in this process also create the fluctuations of the business cycle. The paper thus discusses, first, the basic Schumpeterian premise that, on average, innovation is positively related to firm growth. The existing empirical literature provides various affirmative studies, but there is also a non-negligible number of studies that find an insignificant or even a negative relationship between innovation and firm growth (see e.g. Del Monte and Papagni 2003; Coad and Rao 2008; Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, and Bausch 2011; Demirel and Mazzucato 2012; Colombelli, Haned, and Le Bas 2013) . This ambiguity of the existing literature requires that we again empirically test whether innovation is indeed positively related to firm growth.
However, in line with Schumpeter (1939) , we argue that the positive relation between innovation and firm growth is actually rooted in the recessionary periods of the business cycle. Economic booms usually represent a friendly market environment, where both innovative and non-innovative firms alike can achieve high growth rates. Economic recessions, in contrast, lead to a general increase in competitive pressure (Bloom 2014) . We argue that those firms having timely introduced innovative products or service are better prepared to face this more intense competition than the non-innovative firms. Hence, we argue that, second, innovative firms show relatively higher growth rates than non-innovative firms in periods dominated by recessions; the non-innovative firms will incur most of the losses induced by the decline in economic activity.
Third, we differentiate between innovations based on R&D activities and innovations based on other, non-R&D innovation activities. These two types of innovations make up an equal share of all innovations introduced to the economy (48 vs. 52%). Because R&D activities usually bind more resources, they also tend to generate products or services of a greater innovation depth (Dewar and Dutton 1986; Mairesse and Mohnen 2005; Marsili and Salter 2005; Laursen and Salter 2006; Mata and Woerter 2013) . In contrast, other, non-R&D innovation activities tend to focus more on what is directly feasible, implying that the resulting innovations are more closely oriented at the existing product or service range (Arundel, Bordoy, and Kanerva 2007; Rammer, Czarnitzki, and Spielkamp 2009; Santamaría, Nieto, and Barge-Gil 2009) . Based on the idea of 'saving up' of innovations (Shleifer 1986) , we then argue that firms relying on other, non-R&D innovation activities are likely to commercialise their innovations mostly during economic booms, as they do not expect to be able to assert themselves in the difficult market environments of a recession. In contrast, we argue that firms relying on R&D activities introduce their innovations irrespective of the business cycle development since they expect to prevail in all market environments. Hence, we argue that firms with innovations based on R&D activities show a more stable growth development than firms relying on other, non-R&D innovation activities.
Using panel data of Swiss firms ranging from 1996 to 2014, we find evidence in line with the outlined theoretical arguments. The growth premium innovative firms achieve over non-innovative firms changes considerably over the different stages of the macroeconomic business cycle. Whereas firms with innovations based on R&D activities show higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms in periods dominated by recessions, firms with innovations based on other, non-R&D innovation activities show higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms in periods of economic booms. Hence, on average, over the entire macroeconomic business cycle, innovative firms clearly outgrow non-innovative firms. However, whereas firms with innovations based on R&D activities show a less pro-cyclical growth pattern than non-innovative firms, firms with innovations based on other, non-R&D innovation activities show a more pro-cyclical growth pattern than noninnovative firms (see the stylised results in Figure 2 ).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the relevant literature and proposes three testable hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the data-set and Section 4 explains the econometric models. Section 5 presents the main estimation results. Finally, Section 6 concludes and points at possible policy implications.
Literature and hypotheses
The following conceptual notions and hypotheses are motivated by Schumpeter's view that 'the fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates' (Schumpeter 1950, 83) and that the business cycle results from this ongoing process of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1939) .
Innovation and firm growth
The foundation on which the business cycle theory of Schumpeter (1939) rests is that innovations by firms exert positive growth stimuli onto the economy. Without innovative actions by firms, the economy would continue to reproduce itself, in the so-called 'stationary flow' of economic activity, but it would remain the same and not experience any sort of change. Thus, only the repeated introduction of innovations moves the economy forward and leads to ongoing economic growth. Schumpeter (1939) argues that in the absence of innovations, there would also be no business cycle activity. Only the wavelike introduction of large numbers of firm innovations can move the 'stationary flow' of economic activity sufficiently out of balance to create the ups and downs of the business cycle. Today, the thought that innovation is an important driver behind economic growth has found widespread acceptance among most theoretical economists (see e.g. Aghion and Howitt 1990; Romer 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1993; Geroski 2005) .
Of course, innovation is not always positively related to firm growth. There exist three alternative cases. First, if the firm stops producing the older versions of the products or services and the innovations replace them one to one, the composition of sales will experience a shift, but total firm sales will remain unchanged, leading to the observation of a zero statistical relationship between innovation and firm growth. This is tantamount to say that the firm fully replaces itself (Reinganum 1983) . Second, if the firm stops producing the older versions of the products or services and the newly introduced innovations cannot hold up with the past success of the older versions, the statistical relationship between innovation and firm growth may even turn negative. This situation is likely to occur when the pace of technological change in the industry is very rapid and the firm's own innovations cannot keep up with innovations introduced by its competitors (e.g. Reinganum 1981 Reinganum , 1985 , discusses the implications for the incentives to innovate). Third, there might arise instances of 'cannibalization', meaning that the firm acts as its own competitor (Mason and Milne 1994; Chandy and Tellis 1998) . This will occur if the firm continues to produce the older versions of the products or services and the newly introduced innovations crowd out the sales from the older versions. However, while the costs arising from this kind of firm internal product competition surely lower profits, total firm sales should not differ from a situation where the firm successfully adjusted its overall production.
Hence, depending on the exact interaction between the firm's innovative products and services and its relatively older, non-innovative products and services, we may actually observe instances of a zero or even a negative statistical relationship between the introduction of innovations and the sales growth of firms. The relevant literature on the empirical relationship between innovation and firm growth is indeed somewhat ambiguous. Whereas, for example, Colombelli, Haned, and Le Bas (2013) find a strong positive effect of innovation on firm growth, Del Monte and Papagni (2003) present various empirical studies that show an insignificant statistical relation between innovation and firm growth. Notably, Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, and Bausch (2011) even present a number of studies that find a negative empirical relation between innovation and firm growth. Demirel and Mazzucato (2012) emphasise that the effect of innovation on firm growth may also vary considerably given certain industry characteristics. For example, Del Monte and Papagni (2003) highlight the different effect of R&D in high-tech industries as compared to low-tech industries. In high-tech industries, the large R&D intensities serve as an entry barrier, which guarantee firms high returns to R&D. In the less R&D intensive lowtech industries, by contrast, innovations are easier copied, which implies comparatively lower returns to R&D. Coad and Rao (2008) show that innovations have a large positive effect in the highest growth percentiles, but at the same time also a slightly negative effect in the lowest growth percentiles. They explain this finding by the high degree of chance involved in the success of innovation activities. Some firms simply bet on the 'wrong horse', which becomes clear only with hindsight. Demirel and Mazzucato (2012) investigate a sample of pharmaceutical firms in the US. They show that R&D is positively related to sales growth only for smaller and persistently (over 5 years) patenting firms. For firms with more than 500 employees, R&D even shows a significantly negative sign.
Consequently, in the light of these ambiguous empirical results, we first need to test whether in our case, for the Swiss economy, innovations are indeed significantly positively associated with firm growth. As outlined, from a theoretical perspective, innovations should have a positive effect on firm growth on average. In the constantly evolving market environments of our modern economies, innovations are a must for every firm that wants to achieve sustainable sales growth. The conservative strategy of standing still may in some cases protect the bulk of the existing sales, but over longer time periods competitive pressure will cause a drop in firm sales and therefore lead to negative firm growth. Thus, we argue that, on average, innovative firms experience higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms.
Hypothesis 1: Innovative firms show higher sales growth than non-innovative firms.
Innovation and firm growth over the business cycle
In this section, we discuss whether the validity of Hypothesis 1 changes over the different stages of the macroeconomic business cycle. In particular, we argue that the effect of innovation on firm growth greatly differs between periods of economic recessions and periods of economic booms. The discussion in this section is based on the theoretical framework provided by Schumpeter (1939) . Schumpeter's business cycle theory was never well received amongst economists. This is probably also the reason why there exists hardly any empirical evidence that explicitly links the relationship between innovations and firm growth to Schumpeter's thoughts about the business cycle. 1 In this paper, we emphasise the final stage of the business cycle as described by Schumpeter (1939) , the recession, which is depicted as a process of adaption and readjustment towards the innovations introduced by firms. The central idea of Schumpeter (1939) is that the economy cannot smoothly absorb those innovations, but rather grossly overreacts and thereby creates the fluctuations of the business cycle. In this turbulent process, recessions are the moment where the economy undergoes a relative shift towards the innovative; inferior, older products and services get eliminated from the economy and what remains are the superior innovative products and services. In economic booms, most products sell well, which makes it easier to prosper for all firms in the economy alike. Recessions, by contrast, introduce a harsh competitive environment that creates large performance differentials between firms (Bloom 2014) . We argue that those firms that have timely introduced innovative products and services are better prepared to face the harsh environment of a recession than firms offering only non-innovative products and services. The latter are likely to incur most of the losses induced by the fall in aggregate demand and to experience more negative growth. Hence, in recessions, innovative firms should experience more stable sales growth than firms offering mostly non-innovative products and services. In line with the business cycle theory of Schumpeter (1939) , we therefore argue that the positive sales growth premium of innovators is rooted in the downswings of the business cycle. 1 Schumpeter's business cycle theory is often interpreted as being valid for long-run fluctuations only. Contrary to this popular reception, Schumpeter (1939) himself (rather arbitrarily) differentiates between three types of economic fluctuations, each with a specific time length: Kondratieffs (60 years), Juglars (9 years) and Kitchins (3 years), where each Kondratieff contains an integral number of Juglars and each Juglar contains an integral number of Kitchins. In the paper hand hand, we focus on the macroeconomic business cycle as defined by positive growth followed by negative growth. Schumpeter himself argued that the macroeconomic business cycle need not necessarily coincide with his understanding of the business cycle, with the three fluctuations working their way simultaneously. Nonetheless, we will test whether his theory also extends to the macroeconomic business cycle, the cycle that is of most interest to economists and the public.
The central question is of course why in a recessions the declining aggregate demand should affect the sales of innovative products and services by less than the sales of the existing, non-innovative products and services. For most consumers, recessions are associated with considerable liquidity shortages (Mishkin, Gordon, and Hymans 1977) . Cashstrapped consumers will thus have to decide which products and services they want to continue buying and which ones they are willing to sort out. In the end, the more attentive consumers will keep on buying only those products and services that prove to be best and sort out relatively inferior products and services from their purchasing decisions. Innovative products and services are thereby likely to emerge as winners from this process. Gordon, Goldfarb, and Li (2013) , for instance, show that consumers become decidedly more price-sensitive in recessions, implying that they make more careful purchasing decisions. In reassessing their purchasing decisions, consumers are more likely to stay with innovative products and services and to give up on buying non-innovative products and services, simply because innovative products and services offer higher consumer surpluses on average. This may be because, for example, they are more technically advanced, of a higher quality, or relatively cheaper.
Of course, in the long-run, innovative products and services always tend to replace the existing, non-innovative products and services. This is expressed in Schumpeter's (1950) famous process of creative destruction (Aghion and Howitt 1990) . However, in line with Schumpeter (1939) , we argue that it is in recessions where this replacement process happens; non-innovative products and services get eliminated from the economy and a relative shift of market shares towards innovative products and services takes place. Consequently, we argue that firms having innovations available at the exact moment a recession strikes will experience more stable sales growth rates than firms possessing only various non-innovative products and services. In contrast, in the more favourable environment of an economic boom, market selection is less intense, allowing non-innovative firms to achieve similar sales growth rats as innovative firms. We therefore predict that innovative firms show relatively higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms in recessions as compared to economic booms. Note that we do not argue that firms with innovations gain additional sales in recessions. To the contrary, their sales are likely to decline as well. However, we argue that the sales of innovative firms decline decidedly less than the sales of non-innovative firms. Finally, note that Schumpeter's business cycle theory is mainly valid for recessions and not for severe depressions, such as, for instance, the Great Depression of the 1930s, where economic pressure becomes so strong that market selection gets quite arbitrary and most innovative but illiquid firms go bankrupt.
Unlike Schumpeter (1939) , Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) , for example, do not argue that creative destruction itself causes the business cycle. They rather portray the business cycle as determined through (exogenous) variation in aggregate demand. Hence, similar to our arguments, Caballero and Hammour (1994) argue that, in recessions, the sharp decline in aggregate demand leads to a replacement of outdated units through innovative units. Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) , in contrast, emphasise the influence of opportunity costs; recessions may increase the profitability of a shift towards innovative technologies. Caballero and Hammour (1994) therefore speak of the 'cleansing effect of recessions' and Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) of the 'virtues of bad times'. Stiglitz (1993) contrasts the potentially positive effects of the 'shake-out' caused by a recession with the possibility that firms may cut out more resources than optimal. Imperfect capital markets exacerbate shortages in liquidity (Hall 1992) , which may impede valuable investment into R&D, leading to forgone long-productivity increases in the longer-run. However, while Stiglitz (1993) points out these potential negative side-effects, he agrees that recessions generally imply a renewal of the production structure of an economy.
There exists only few empirical evidence on how the impact of innovation output on firm growth evolves over the business cycle. Geroski and Machin (1992) find that the process of innovating makes firms more perceptive, more flexible, and more adaptable and that they therefore become less responsive to economic shocks. Dachs et al. (2017) find that in economic recessions employment growth due to the sales of old products performs quite badly, whereas employment growth due to the sales of new products remains almost unaffected. Teplykh (2018) finds that the 2008 crisis forced firms to become more efficient in the exploitation of their resources used for knowledge creation, whereas there is no evidence for a change in the (insignificant) relation between the patent intensity and economic performance. Finally, Sidorkin and Srholec (2014) find that precrisis innovation activity increased the survival of firms in emerging countries in Eastern and Southern Europe during the 2008 recession. Hence, while the results of Geroski and Machin (1992) , Dachs et al. (2017) and Sidorkin and Srholec (2014) would support our theoretical arguments, the results of Teplykh (2018) remain inconclusive. However, in line with the argumentation of this section, the second hypothesis is formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Innovative firms show relatively higher sales growth than non-innovative firms in periods of recessions as compared to periods of economic booms.
R&D based and non-R&D based innovation and firm growth
A second central thought of Schumpeter's (1939) business cycle theory is that firms tend to bring forward innovations in waves. In Schumpeter's theory, breakthrough innovations trigger a surge of innovative activities, leading firms to introduce large numbers of followup innovations, which ultimately create the upswings of the business cycle. This idea has been further developed by Shleifer (1986) , who models the business cycle as an outcome of firms' expectations about future demand development. Firms discover innovations in a constant, random rate. However, as soon as they introduce those innovations to the market, competitors will start to imitate them. In order to maximise profits, firms thus tend wait with the market introduction of their innovations until the more promising times of the next economic boom.
It might of course be quite a risky strategy to hold back innovations until the market environment becomes more beneficial, as technological progress by competitors could make innovations obsolete rather quickly (Fabrizio and Tsolmon 2014) . Nonetheless, the possibility that firms may save up their innovations until the next economic boom has interesting implications for the theoretical outline of this paper. Yet, we argue that the 'saving up' argument does not hold for all product and service innovations alike. Shleifer (1986 Shleifer ( , 1182 himself acknowledges that 'firms with big ideas need not wait for the boom, even when firms with small ideas do'. In this paper, we operationalise 'big ideas' as innovations based on R&D activities and 'small ideas' as innovations based on other, non-R&D innovation activities. The latter type means that firms reported innovations, but no R&D activities; the development costs for the innovations are therefore spread over other departments of the firm. On average, firms introduce about as many innovations based on R&D activities as innovations based on other, non-R&D innovation activities (48% vs. 52%, see Section 3).
The pursuit of other, non-R&D innovation activities typically concerns the exploitation of the firm's existing product and service range, with insights taken from the production process, but also from the marketing, design, or sales department (Barge-Gil, Nieto, and Santamaria 2011). This implies that innovations based on other, non-R&D innovation activities generally have a more applied focus; they are discovered step-by-step in a learning using process, incorporating the experience from the various different departments. These types of innovations are therefore more down-to-earth; they are more likely to be based on what is currently feasible (i.e. doing better what we did already) (Arundel, Bordoy, and Kanerva 2007; Rammer, Czarnitzki, and Spielkamp 2009; Santamaría, Nieto, and Barge-Gil 2009; Huang, Arundel, and Hollanders 2012) .
In contrast, the pursuit of R&D activities increases the probability that the firm discovers more advanced innovations (i.e. doing what we did not do before) (Marsili and Salter 2005) . R&D activities require firms to commit considerable investments, which increases the risk of the innovation process (Mata and Woerter 2013) . However, on average, R&D activities generate significantly higher rewards on the developed innovative products and services and offer decidedly larger performance opportunities (Dewar and Dutton 1986; Mairesse and Mohnen 2005; Laursen and Salter 2006) .
In sum, whereas other, non-R&D innovation activities are of utmost importance to assure continuous improvement of the firm's existing range of products and services, their applied, more practically oriented focus tends to generate new products and services of a lower innovation depth, characterised by only minor differences to the existing products and services. In contrast, R&D activities tend to generate new products and services characterised by a higher innovation depth, allowing firms to themselves actively shape market developments. Consequently, we argue that firms with innovations based on R&D activities pay less attention to business cycle developments. Because these firms expect their 'big ideas' to prevail in all possible market environments, they introduce their innovations as soon as they are developed. Hence, firms with innovations based on R&D activities are less likely to save up their innovations for the next cyclical upturn. By contrast, we argue that firms with innovations based on other, non-R&D innovation activities expect that in the adverse market environments of a recession their comparatively 'small ideas' will not have the potential to assert themselves. Firms relying on other, non-R&D innovation activities therefore tend to refrain from introducing their innovations in periods dominated by recessions and rather save them up for the next economic boom. Thus, we argue that Hypothesis 2 is mainly valid for those firms that introduce innovations based on R&D activities. Firms relying on other, non-R&D innovation activities, by contrast, are likely to be as sensitive to cyclical shocks as non-innovative firms.
Hypothesis 3: The sales growth premium innovative firms experience over non-innovative firms in periods dominated by recessions is higher for firms relying on R&D activities.
Data and definition of variables
In order to test the derived hypotheses, we make use of eight waves of the Swiss Innovation Survey (SIS), covering the time period 1996-2014. The SIS is the equivalent of the wellknown Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European Union. From 1996 to 2010, the survey waves were carried out in three-year intervals. In contrast, from 2011 to 2014, in order to synchronise with the CIS, the survey waves were carried out in two-year intervals. The SIS is based on a stratified random sample of firms with more than 5 employees, drawn from the Swiss business census. It is thus representative of the entire Swiss economy. The SIS includes all relevant industries in manufacturing, construction and services. Stratification is on 34 industries (2-digit) and within each industry on three industry-specific firm size classes.
The response rates for the different survey waves vary between 32 and 40%. In order to asses potential non-response biases, every survey wave was followed by a series of telephone interviews on a sample of each time 500 non-responding firms. Information obtained from these telephone interviews on variables like product innovations, process innovations and R&D activities has always shown that the data do not contain systematic biases inflicted by the non-response of firms to the written questionnaire. In sum, we can make use of an unbalanced panel of 7120 observations.
The sales growth rate (dependent variable) is in line with the literature defined as the logarithmic difference: ln(sales i,t ) − ln(sales i,t−1 ). This definition has the advantage of being additive and symmetric (Törnqvist, Vartia, and Vartia 1985) . Table 1 summarises the average sales growth rates for the seven sample periods (i.e. the merged eight SIS cross-sections). It shows very positive average sales growth rates for the three periods 1996-1998, 1999-2001 and 2005-2007 . In contrast, it shows clearly negative average sales growth rates for the two periods 2002-2004 and 2008-2010. In the two periods 2011-2012 and 2013-2014, the average sales growth rates are positive, but very small. These numbers quite accurately reflect the development of the Swiss business cycle as published by the official statistics and depicted in Figure 1 (SECO State Secretariat for Economic Affairs 2017). The main line in Figure 1 shows the seasonally adjusted, quarterly GDP growth rates of Switzerland over the observed sample period. The straight vertical lines indicate the time lapses between the single survey cross-sections.
The European Union defines a recession as two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth rates. Hence, there happened to be only two recessions over the observed sample period: a moderate recession from Q4 2002 to Q1 2003 and quite a severe recession from Q4 2008 to Q2 2009. The latter recession was caused by the global financial crisis of 2008, cumulating in the Great Recession, which is now commonly acknowledged to have been the most severe economic crisis the world has experienced since the end of the Great Depression in the 1930s (Grusky, Western, and Wimer 2011) . Important in our context is that both the Q4 2002 -Q1 2003 recession and the Q4 2008 -Q2 2009 recession fall into those two sample periods where we also observe negative average sales growth rates (2002-2004 and 2008-2010) . The two periods 2002-2004 and 2008-2010 are therefore periods dominated by the occurrence of a recession, even though the cumulated GDP growth over all three years was both times somewhat positive. It is the fall in aggregate demand during Q4 2002 -Q1 2003 and Q4 2008 -Q2 2009 we are interested in. These two severe, negative economic shocks provide an ideal background against which we can empirically test the derived hypotheses. In particular, we argue that the Q4 2002 -Q1 2003 recession caused a higher sales growth premium for firms with R&D based innovations in the 2002-2004 period. Likewise, it was the Q4 2008 -Q2 2009 recession that caused a higher sales growth premium for firms with R&D based innovations in the 2008-2010 period. We argue that these two negative shocks are the key to understand any growth differentials between innovative and non-innovative firms in 2002 -2010 . Consequently, we view 1996 , 1999 -2001 , 2005 -2007 Table 1 shows an on average negative sales growth rate for Swiss firms over the two periods 2002-2004 and 2008-2010 , whereas the cumulative economic growth rate of Switzerland was slightly positive in these two periods, too (see Figure 1 ). The reason for this particular divergence is that in a recession economy-wide sales always decline by more than economic value added because the latter variable also incorporates various cost components. When the economy-wide sales decline, firms can react to recessions with cost reductions like, for example, a switch of their suppliers, which partly offset declines in aggregate productivity and thus hold economic growth more stable in comparison. The slightly positive cumulative economic growth in the two periods 2002-2004 and 2008-2010 does not pose a problem for the empirical setup, since we observe a 'structural break' in the economy-wide composition of firms sales during the two severe recessions Q4 2002 -Q1 2003 and Q4 2008 -Q2 2009 . While consumers continued buying innovative products and services, they sorted out various non-innovative products and services from their purchasing decisions. This 'structural break' then continued, consumers did not revert to their initial purchasing decisions. Thus, we can characterise both 2002-2004 and 2008-2010 as periods dominated by recessions. Table 2 shows the variables we use in our empirical models. The main explanatory variables are given by the two dummy variables inno_rnd and inno_other. The variable inno_rnd is coded as '1' if there is a product or service innovation in the contemporaneous sample period and there have been R&D activities in the lagged sample period; otherwise inno_rnd is coded as '0'. For example, inno_rnd equals '1' if the firm introduced a product or service innovation in 2008-2010 and had also been running R&D activities in 2005-2007. In all other cases, inno_rnd takes the value '0'. In contrast, inno_other is coded as '1' if there is a product or service innovation in the contemporaneous sample period and there have been no R&D activities, but only other, non-R&D innovation activities in the lagged sample period. The term 'other, non-R&D innovation activities' means that the firm reported a product or service innovation, but that it had no R&D activities; the development costs for the innovations are therefore spread over other departments. Note that inno_rnd and inno_other, when controlled for stratification of the SIS, show very similar statistical frequencies. Over the covered time span, 33% of firms introduced product or service innovations, whereof 48% introduced innovations based on R&D activities and 52% introduced innovations based on other, non-R&D innovation activities (note that the descriptive statistics in Table 2 are the sample figures, stratification is not considered.)
The reason why we operationalise inno_rnd and inno_other as innovations in the contemporaneous period is that we want to measure how innovations emerging from both types of innovation activities (R&D and non-R&D) relate to sales growth at the exact time a recession or a boom strikes. We want to know the contribution of the two types of innovations to the stability of sales growth in the moment the economic environment is most unfavourable or favourable, respectively. Moreover, we coded inno_rnd and inno_other with respect to the presence of R&D activities in the lagged period because R&D activities take about 2-3 years until they translate into innovation results (Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen 2010) . For example, if we want to know whether innovations based on R&D activities experienced a more stable demand in the 2008-2010 period, we will need to look whether there were R&D activities in the lagged 2004-2007 period, and then, consequently, whether the firm also introduced the resulting innovations in the contemporaneous 2008-2010 period. In this respect, the sample design of the SIS fits quite well the 2-3-year average time lag observed in the relevant literature.
In the theoretical background, we assumed that innovative firms differ from noninnovative firms only because they introduce product or service innovations to the market. However, the two explanatory variables inno_rnd and inno_other may also capture some structural differences (see Section 4). In order to ensure that it is indeed the type of innovative product or service which is responsible for the higher sales growth of innovative firms, we apply two alternative explanatory variables in our empirical model. The variable new_to_market represents the growth rate of all sales due to innovative products and services new to the market, meaning that the innovations have not been previously introduced by any of the firm's competitors. In contrast, the variable new_to_firm represents the growth rate of all sales due to innovative products and services new to the firm, meaning that at least some of the competitors have already introduced the respective innovations and the firm is only a follower in its main market. This twofold operationalisation builds a bridge between two usually separated strands of the literature, discussing, on the one hand, the organisation of the innovation process (Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Chesbrough 2003; Argyres and Silverman 2004; Cassiman and Gambardella 2009 ) and, on the other hand, the characteristics of the resulting innovative products and services (Schumpeter 1934; Schumpeter 1939; Schumpeter 1950; Shleifer 1986; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Lentz and Mortensen 2008) . The basic idea is that R&D activities enable the development of products and services of a greater innovation depth (new to the market) and that other, non-R&D innovation activities are associated with in comparison more incremental innovations (new to the firm).
To control for firm size, we create the two dummy variables small_d and medium_d. The small_d dummy is coded as '1' if the firm has between 5 and less than 50 employees; in all other cases it is coded as '0'. The medium_d dummy is coded as '1' if the firms has between 50 and less than 250 employees; in all other cases it is coded as '0'. This is the standard categorisation of firm size classes as defined by the European Commission (2015). The large firms with more than 250 employees will serve as the omitted baseline category against which small_d and medium_d are compared to in all of our regressions. We refrain from introducing the continuous number of employees to the model, as this would imply that we are measuring sales per employee and not total sales anymore. We explicitly want to allow for the possibility that firm innovations can lead to an increase in factor inputs like capital or labour. Table 2 also contains the control variables we use in our empirical models. The most important control variable in our context is the firm-specific export share. Switzerland's economy is characterised by a great number of exporting firms. The share of exporting firms in the Swiss economy amounts to about 29%. This share is considerably higher for innovative firms (45%) than for non-innovative firms (21%) (these numbers are calculated from the SIS controlling of stratification). The issue is that the both Q4 2002 -Q1 2003 and Q4 2008 -Q2 2009 were essentially imported recessions that only then spread to the rest of the economy. And since innovative firms are much more export intensive, they were especially prone to suffer from these two recessions. Non-innovative firms, in contrast, were, at least at the beginning, better protected from the export induced fall in demand. However, we would like to have a recession treatment that is the same for both innovative firms and non-innovative firms alike. By including the firm-specific export share as a control variable, we are able to hold the exposure to these two imported recession constant; what remains is solely the aggregate fall in Swiss demand. Hence, it enables us to compare the sales growth rates between innovative and non-innovative firms free from any concerns about their respective exposure to international markets.
We also include two variables measuring the equity and credit constraints every firm faces in the pursuit of its innovation activities. Both variables range on a subjective scale from '1' not relevant to '4' very relevant. They control for the likely instance that cashflow rich firms have more means to increase their innovation activities. They both enter the empirical model in the lagged period, the time period where the innovation activities relevant for contemporaneous sales growth took place. The variable price competition controls for the possibility that the sales growth premium of innovative firms could be the result of limited competition in certain market niches, a phenomenon often observed in the Swiss economy. This categorical variable is measured on a subjective scale ranging from 'very weak competition' (1) to 'very strong competition' (5). We also include the natural logarithm of firm age to all of our specifications. Finally, we include a variable controlling for the share of employees having a tertiary education, which ranges from 1 to 100. It serves as an indicator of firms' human capital and is included to improve the precision of the other estimates. That is, it controls for the possibility that higher growth may be caused by, for example, a better qualification of employees in innovative firms. Table 2 also shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables in our empirical models. Note that the statistics are restricted to the number of observations actually used in the multivariate regression, that is, to the number of observations that remain after merging the respective survey waves of the SIS together. Moreover, in all descriptive statistics and regressions, extreme growth observations (more than +300%) were removed since OLS is extremely sensitive to such outliers. To make the distribution of the logarithmic dependent variable symmetric again, we also removed negative growth rates with a value lower than -75%. This amounts to a drop of about 1.4% of all observations. This threshold is arguably set quite arbitrary, but results do not prove sensitive to the use of lower thresholds; the results of our baseline regressions are robust in this respect. In contrast, above this +300% / -75% sales growth threshold, results become somewhat unstable; they are sometimes more and sometimes less significant. This indicates that for extreme growth obser-vations, the hypotheses we propose in this paper are only partially affirmed. However, the super growth of single firms is anyway hardly measurable within a regression context comparing averages; such firms seldom follow regular patterns. Case studies would probably be more helpful in understanding those super growth firms.
Empirical strategy
This section introduces the econometric models used to test the proposed hypotheses. We formulate Equation (1) to test Hypothesis 1, whether firms that introduce innovations experience higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms. We use the full panel information and apply pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects. The main interest thereby lies on the two explanatory variables inno_rnd i,t and inno_other i,t , that is, the two binary variables dividing the sample into innovative firms and non-innovative firms, respectively. 10 k=5 β k X k,i,t−1 represents the set of control variables described in the data section; firm size, export share, qualification of employees, firm age, price competition and equity and credit constraints. Note that the models also contain a full set of dummies for industries (2-digit level), time periods and regions (NUTS-2).
ln(sales
In order to test Hypothesis 2, we run separate estimations of Equation (1) on every crosssection of our panel. As outlined in Section 3, we argue that the different cross-sections of our panel represent distinct stages of the Swiss business cycle. Hence, estimating Equation (1) on every cross-section allows to identify how the relation between our two main explanatory variables inno_rnd i,t and inno_other i,t and the dependent variable sales growth rate changes over the Swiss business cycle (see Archibugi, Filippetti, and Frenz 2013 for a similar procedure to identify business cycle effects). For example, since we identified the 2008-2010 cross-section as a period dominated by an economic recession, we should observe a significantly positive relation between inno_rnd i,t and the sales growth rate in this period, but not so between inno_other i,t and the sales growth rate. However, the presence of innovative products and services may not be the only aspect that differentiates innovative firms from non-innovative firms. There may be certain structural differences between innovative and non-innovative firms, which are at the same time also correlated with the development of the sales growth rate. For example, R&D activity could correlate with structural characteristics actually responsible for the statistical relationships we observe. Consequently, we address this problem by introducing the two alternative explanatory variables new_to_market i,t and new_to_firm i,t . Because these two variables provide us with information about the actual numbers of product and service innovations sold in the market, they are less prone to capture only the structural differences between firms. Most important, these two alternative explanatory variables allow us to exploit statistical variation within the sample of innovative firms. While inno_rnd i,t and inno_other i,t rely on variation between innovative and non-innovative firms (the extensive margin), new_to_market i,t and new_to_firm i,t rely on variation within the group of innovative firms (the intensive margin). A statistical analysis within these two groups of innovative firms is less subject to unobserved structural characteristics than a comparison of innovative and non-innovative firms. Note that a multivariate regression of new_to_market i,t on inno_rnd i,t and inno_other i,t shows that sales growth due to innovations new to the market is more positively associated with innovations based on R&D activities than with innovations based on other, non-R&D activities. Hence, as theoretically expected, R&D based innovations tend to more often go hand in hand with innovations new to the market.
A potential concern to the consistency of our empirical analysis is the instance of sample selection, which means that some groups of firms could have a higher probability to exit from the sample. However, this particular problem is likely to be more severe for non-innovative firms. Because non-innovative firms are usually less competitive, they face a higher probability of going bankrupt. Non-innovative firms are therefore more likely to exit the sample, implying that we observe a selection of only better performing noninnovative firms. The problem is of course aggravated in economically difficult periods. However, this kind of sample selection would only lead to an underestimation of the growth premium of innovative firms since we are comparing them with the relatively more competitive, surviving non-innovative firms.
In order to exploit the time variation of our panel, we apply a difference-in-differences (DiD) setting (Angrist and Pischke 2008) . The innovative firms thereby represent the treatment group, while the non-innovative firms represent the control group. We again differentiate between innovative firms relying on R&D activities inno_rnd i,t and innovative firms relying on other, non-R&D innovation activities inno_other i,t . The time indicator of the DiD setting is given by the dummy recession_d, which equals '1' in 2002-2004 and 2008-2010 , the two periods dominated by economic recessions, and takes on the value of zero otherwise. We also include the control variables of Table 2 ( 11 k=2 β k X k,i,t−1 ) as well as the 2-digit industry dummies (industry_d j ). Moreover, we include interaction terms between all these control variables and the time indicator. This means that the two interaction terms inno_rnd * recession_d and inno_other * recession_d will show the conditional average treatment effects under control of the conditional average treatment effects of all control variables.
(2) (1) is estimated by OLS, Column (2) by random effects and Column (3) by fixed effects. All three estimations contain dummies for industries (2-digit), time periods and regions (NUTS-2). The standard errors of the coefficients are shown in the parentheses. Significance levels: * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05 and * p < 0.1.
Results

Results for the pooled panel
ordinary least squares (OLS), random effects (RE), and fixed effects (FE). The robustness of this finding over the three different estimations is strong evidence in line with Hypothesis 1. On average, innovative firms show significantly higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms. Notably, this holds for firms with innovations based on R&D activities (inno_rnd) and for firms with innovations based on other, non-R&D activities (inno_other). The growth returns of these two types of product and service innovations are quite similar; on average, innovative firms achieve an about 4 percent higher sales growth rate than non-innovative firms. Because R&D activities are partly sunk costs, there are not only barriers to entry, but also substantial barriers to exit (Sutton 1991) . Hence, the time variance of the inno_rnd variable is rather limited. Nevertheless, we observe a significantly positive relation between inno_rnd and the sales growth rate not only over the entire panel (OLS and RE), but also when we use the within-transformation (FE). Since the coefficient of inno_rnd is very similar in all three estimations, we can conclude that time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity does not inflict a major bias on the obtained results (the same holds for inno_other). A simple t-test for the equality of inno_rnd and inno_other over the three models shows p-value of 0.23 and higher. This is a first indication that our main results are not simply driven by structural differences between innovative and non-innovative firms.
The control variables in Table 3 reveal some interesting patterns. Whereas firms reporting equity constraints show significantly lower sales growth than non-constrained firms, this is not the case for firms reporting credit constraints. Hence, liquidity constrains Table 4 . Estimation of Equation (1) on the different cross-sections.
(1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) DV: ln(sales) i,t − ln(sales) i,t−1 1996-1998 1999-2001 2002-2004 2005-2007 2008-2010 2011-2012 2013-2014 Notes: The table shows the estimations of Equation (1) on the different cross-sections of the panel. The dependent variable is the logarithmic sales growth rate. The explanatory variables are lagged by one period, expect for inno_rnd i,t and inno_other i,t (see Section 3). All Columns (1)-(7) are estimated by OLS. They contain dummies for industries (2-digit) and regions (NUTS-2). The standard errors of the coefficients are shown in the parentheses. Significance levels: * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05 and * p < 0.1.
in innovation activities only lower sales growth when they concern equity. The firm age variable is significantly negatively related to the sales growth rate; younger firms grow faster than older firm. This is a commonly observed result in the literature (see e.g. Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda 2013) . The significantly negative coefficient of price competition provides some evidence in line with another Schumpeterian idea, namely that limited competition is conducive to aggregate growth. Firms require a certain degree of appropriability, otherwise they will not be willing to innovate in the first place. The negative coefficient of tertiary education seems to be puzzling at first. However, it may reflect the strength of the renowned vocational education system in Switzerland. The most important control variable export share is also negatively related to the sales growth rate. Firms with higher export share tend to show lower sales growth rates on average. Table 4 will show that this effect is entirely driven by the recessionary period 2008-2010, which what we intended to pick up with this variable. The export share assures that the 2008-2010 crisis treatment is the same for the more export intensive innovative firms and the less export intensive non-innovative firms (see data section). Finally, the two employee size dummies medium_d and small_d are neither positively nor negatively related to the sales growth rate, meaning that firm size does not matter for sales growth. The fixed effects estimation, in contrast, shows a significantly positive coefficient for both medium_d and small_d. However, size dummies have no meaningful interpretation over the time dimension of a panel, as they are driven by regression to the mean effects (Friedman 1992) .
Results over the business cycle
In Table 4 , we look again at Equation (1), but this time estimated for each cross-section separately. This allows identifying how the different stages of the Swiss business cycle, reflected by the different cross-sections of our panel, impact the innovation/growth relationship. Table 4 demonstrates that firms with R&D based innovations achieve higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms only in 2002-2004 and 2008-2010 , the two time periods characterised by the occurrence of a recession. Neither the three prosperous economic environments 1996-1998, 1999-2001 and 2005-2007 , nor the two economically more stagnant environments 2011-2012 and 2013-2014 show significant sales growth premia for firms with R&D based innovations. This provides empirical evidence in line with Hypothesis 2: The sales growth premium innovative firms experience over non-innovative firms is higher in periods dominated by recessions than in periods of economic booms.
In fact, Table 4 shows that the positive sales growth premium for firms with R&D based innovations found in Table 3 is entirely driven by the two recessionary periods 2002-2004 and 2008-2010. Since Table 4 shows that in periods dominated by recessions only the inno_rnd variable is significantly positively related to the sales growth rate, we have evidence in line with Hypothesis 3. Only firms with R&D based innovations show a more stable sales growth path than non-innovative firms. While they expand similar to non-innovative firms in economic booms, firms with R&D based innovations manage to hold their sales growth more stable in periods dominated by recessions. In contrast, firms with innovations based on other, non-R&D innovation activities (inno_other) show the exact opposite pattern. Whereas they experience the same drop in sales growth as non-innovative firms in periods characterised by recessions, they outgrow non-innovative firms in the two booming periods 1999-2001 and 2005-2007 . Figure 2 portrays the results of Table 4 in stylised form.
In Section 2, we explained this particular pattern through the idea that firms relying on R&D activities introduce their innovations irrespective of the business cycle, while firms relying on other, non-R&D innovation activities introduce their innovations procyclically. In this respect, Table 5 presents the estimation of the two dependent variables inno_rnd and inno_other on the separate period dummies. The 2008-2010 period, which contains the most severe recession, is used as the baseline category. Note that in Table 5 we omitted all control variables, as they are not of direct interest here. Table 5 shows that firms introduced significantly more innovations based on other, non-R&D innovation activities in the booming 2005-2007 period than in the crisis struck 2008-2010 period. In contrast, firms pursing R&D activities show a very different introduction pattern. Importantly, there is a strong, almost linear reduction in the probability to introduce R&D based innovations. This development mirrors the secular trend towards a lower R&D propensity in the Swiss economy, as documented by Arvanitis et al. (2017) . However, besides this downward trend, innovations based on R&D activities do not show any joint variation with the business cycle. In sharp contrast, firms relying on other, non-R&D innovation activities exhibit a strong pro-cyclical variation, with the booming period 2005-2007 showing a highly positive and significant coefficient. Table 2 as well as dummies for industries (2-digit) and regions (NUTS-2). They are omitted for brevity. The complete table can be obtained from the authors upon request. The standard errors of the coefficients are shown in the parentheses. Significance levels: * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05 and * p < 0.1. Table 6 shows the associations between the dependent variable (total) sales growth rate and the sales growth rate of innovations new to the market (new_to_market) and of innovations new to the firm (new_to_firm). Because these two variables have only been part of the SIS since 2005, Table 6 shows only the four periods 2005-2007, 2008-2010, 2011-2012 and 2013-2014. In the Columns (1) Table 4 in the booming 2005-2007 period. We therefore conclude from Table 6 that innovations new to the market guarantee more stable sales growth rates in periods dominated by recessions, whereas innovations new to the firm may provide somewhat higher sales growth rates during economic boom periods. Table 6 demonstrates that the results of Table 4 can be credibly traced back to the presence or absence of innovative products or services; the results of Table 4 are not simply caused by organisational differences between innovative and noninnovative firms.
Structural characteristics
Finally, as a test for the presence of time invariant omitted variables, we also included the lagged dependent variable to the estimations. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable controls for eventual biases inflicted by the unobserved fixed effect (Angrist and Pischke 2008) . The unreported results confirm our findings in Table 4 (the respective estimation table can be obtained from the authors upon request). Of course, due to the short panel, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is likely to be biased (Nickell 1981) . 3 Yet, the key insight of this particular robustness test was that our two main explanatory variables inno_rnd and inno_other remained unaffected. This provides evidence that time invariant omitted variables are not the actual cause behind the empirical patterns we observe in Table 4 . Finally, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable also showed that the unbalanced nature of our panel data does not pose a major problem. The additional sample selection induced by merging each cross-section with its prior one does not affect the results, despite the markedly reduced sample sizes. Table 7 shows the results of the DiD estimation of Equation (2) on the full panel data-set. Note that only the variables of interest are shown. Table 7 actually contains 89 variables, as displayed in Equation (2) in Section 4. These control variables are necessary because we want to identify conditional average treatment effects. The baseline recession_d dummy is omitted as well because it has no meaningful interpretation in the presence of the many interaction terms. The results of Table 7 again confirm our theoretical arguments. The significantly positive interaction term inno_rnd * recession_d demonstrates that firms with innovations based on R&D activities achieve additional sales growth over noninnovative firms in periods dominated by recessions. Note that the baseline variable inno_rnd is (weakly) significant as well. This indicates, in contrast to Table 4 , that firms with innovations based on R&D activities slightly outgrow non-innovative firms in periods of economic booms, too. The significantly positive baseline variable inno_other, on the other hand, again aligns with the results of Table 4 ; firms with innovations based on non-R&D innovations activities show higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms only Table 6 . Estimations of the different cross-sections using new_to_market and new_to_firm. Table 2 as well as dummies for industries (2-digit) and regions (NUTS-2). Moreover, it contains interactions between all the control variables and recession_d. These additional 83 covariates are omitted for brevity. recession_d is also omitted since it has no meaningful interpretation in the presence of the many interaction terms. The complete table can be obtained from the authors upon request. The standard errors of the coefficients are shown in the parentheses. Significance levels: * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05 and * p < 0.1.
Difference-in-difference
in periods of economic booms. The near zero interaction term inno_other * recession_d shows that in periods dominated by recessions firms with innovations based on non-R&D innovations activities do not achieve any additional sales growth over non-innovative firms. The export variable also shows the same pattern as in Table 7 ; firms with high export shares exhibit more negative sales growth in periods dominated by recessions. In sum, the analysis of the time variance in Table 7 nicely confirms the analysis of the cross-sectional variance in Table 4 . The only difference is that innovative firms relying on R&D activities show slightly higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms in economic booms, too.
Process innovation
So far, we have only looked at innovations in products and services. In Table 8 , we run the exact same regressions as in Table 4 , but this time we use process innovations and not product or service innovations as explanatory variables (innopc_rnd and innopc_other). Process innovations and product or service innovations usually overlap, as they often complement each other. However, there also exist differences. For example, only 67% of the firms with product or service innovations based on R&D activities introduced at the same time also process innovations. Overall, Table 8 shows similar results as Table 4 . There is one important difference, however. Unlike in Table 4 , process innovations based on other, non-R&D activities show higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms in the 2008-2010 recessionary period, too. A potential explanation for this observation is that process innovations are not subject to the 'saving up' argument of Shleifer (1986) . Because they are firm-internal, firms do not gain from awaiting the next cyclical upturn. Firms introduce process innovations as soon as they are developed, even more so in recessions, when the cost pressure is high. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) DV: ln(sales) i,t − ln(sales) i,t−1 1996-1998 1999-2001 2002-2004 2005-2007 2008-2010 2011-2012 2013-2014 Notes: The table shows the estimations of the logarithmic sales growth rate on innopc_rnd and innopc_other and the same control variables as Table 4 . innopc_rnd and innopc_other are coded not as product or service innovations, but as process innovations instead. The explanatory variables are lagged by one period, expect for innopc_rnd and innopc_other (see Section 3). All Columns (1)- (7) are estimated by OLS. They contain dummies for industries (2-digit) and regions (NUTS-2). The standard errors of the coefficients are shown in the parentheses. Significance levels: * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05 and * p < 0.1.
Conclusion
Based on a representative panel data-set of Swiss firms covering the period 1996-2014, this paper has investigated how the empirical relation between innovation and firm growth changes over the different stages of the macroeconomic business cycle. The paper finds broad empirical support for the arguments outlined in the theoretical section. Making use of the entire panel data-set, the paper shows that innovative firms exhibit significantly higher sales growth rates than non-innovative firms, confirming the Schumpeterian premise that innovation leads to higher firm growth. This finding extends to both firms that introduce innovations based on R&D activities and firms that introduce innovations based on other, non-R&D innovation activities. However, the paper shows that the higher sales growth of firms relying on R&D activities stems from different stages of the business cycle than the higher sales growth of firms relying on other, non-R&D innovation activities. Whereas firms that introduce innovations based on R&D activities outgrow non-innovative firms in periods dominated by economic recessions, they show similar sales growth rates as non-innovative firms in periods of economic booms. In contrast, firms that introduce innovations based on other, non-R&D innovation activities show the exact opposite pattern; they display similar sales growth rates as non-innovative firms in periods dominated by economic recessions, but tend to outgrow non-innovative firms in periods of economic booms. Hence, while firms with R&D based innovations are more resilient to business cycle fluctuations than non-innovative firms, firms with innovations based on other, non-R&D innovations activities are more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations than non-innovative firms (see the stylised results in Figure 2 ).
The observation that in periods dominated by recessions innovative firms achieve higher growth rates than non-innovative firms is in line with Schumpeter's (1939) business cycle theory, where economic recessions bring about a renewal of the aggregate production of the economy. The most outdated, non-innovative products and services get eliminated from the economy and a relative shift of market shares towards superior innovative products and services takes place. After having reached the bottom, the economy then starts out for a new cycle, with again new innovations entering the scene. Thus, looking only at the aggregate growth rates of an economy hides the aspect that the business cycle is actually about replacing the old with the new.
Moreover, the paper refined Schumpeter (1939) with the ideas of Shleifer (1986) , arguing that firms wait with the commercialisation of their innovations until the more profityielding times of the next economic boom. Based on Shleifer (1986 Shleifer ( , 1182 , the paper argued the 'saving up' of innovations is less relevant for firms with innovations based on R&D that activities. Because they expect their 'big ideas' to prevail under all market circumstances, firms relying on R&D activities need not wait for the next cyclical upturn. In contrast, firms relying on other, non-R&D activities are more likely to hold back their innovations, since they expect their 'small ideas' not to have the potential to assert themselves in the difficult market environment of a recession. Hence, 'saving up' of innovations explains why in periods dominated by economic recessions only firms relying on R&D activities show more stable sales growth rates than non-innovative firms. Firms relying on other, non-R&D activities tend to hold back their innovations and thus outgrow non-innovative firms only later on in periods of economic booms.
The obtained results suggest that high-quality innovations may greatly contribute to the resilience of an economy in the face of periods dominated by economic recessions. Potential policy measures to strengthen the innovation capacities of firms usually target an increase in economic well-being. However, our results suggest that, as a secondary effect, such measures may also increase the resilience of firms against internationally triggered economic crises. An economy populated by firms always producing the most innovative products and services will be better protected from the pressure induced by a fall of aggregate demand in international markets. Importantly, the innovation capacity of an economy has to be strengthened well before an economic crisis hits. Policy interventions during a crisis will not achieve the same results anymore. Hud and Hussinger (2015) , for instance, show that during the crisis year 2009 R&D subsidies tended to crowd out private R&D expenditures, as firms reallocated resources to those business areas they deemed more important. Hence, a pro-active policy may stabilise firms' R&D efforts during an economic crisis. But the resilience of an economy towards a crisis is determined mostly by its ex-ante innovation capacity.
